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Abstract
We explain excess volatility, short-term momentum and long-term rever-
sal of asset prices by a repeated game version of Keynes’ beauty contest.
In every period the players can either place a buy or sell order on the
asset market. The actual price movement is determined by average mar-
ket orders and noise. It is common knowledge that the noise process is
an exogenous random walk. Our model explains short-term momentum
and long-term reversal of stock prices by unpredictable switches in the co-
ordination of the players. When the players are coordinated on buying
(selling), we say the market is in the up (down) mood. In this model
changing investor sentiment is a rational strategy as it leads to a Nash
equilibrium of the coordination game. We give experimental evidence in
support of our claims.
Keywords: Experimental asset markets, investor sentiment, behavioral fi-
nance.
JEL-Classification: G12, C91.
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1 Introduction
Ninety percent of what we do is based on perception. It doesn’t matter if that
perception is right or wrong or real. It only matters that other people in the
market believe it. I may know it’s crazy, I may think it’s wrong. But I lose my
shirt by ignoring it.
“Making Book on the Buck”
Wall Street Journal, Sept. 23, 1988, p. 17
Traditional finance argues that stock prices follow their fundamental values.
According to this view, expressed for example in the form of the discounted
dividends model, stock prices are equal to the present value of expected future
dividends. Moreover, on this assumption any short-term fluctuations in prices
result from unforeseen changes in expected future dividends. Consequently, all
period-to-period price changes of a stock are unpredictable random movements
(see Cootner (1964) for an early treatment of this view which was most promi-
nently put forward by Fama (1970)). These cornerstones of traditional finance
can be derived from asset pricing models where investors maximize expected
utility over an infinite horizon and have rational expectations with respect to the
price process (Lucas (1978)). In addition, they are certainly sound guidelines for
investors who hold an asset indefinitely.
However, recent empirical evidence has cast substantial doubt on the dis-
counted dividends model and the unpredictability of stock market prices. Whereas
dividend growth is a good indicator for stock market prices in the long run, on
2
shorter horizons stock prices often deviate substantially from their fundamen-
tal values and are more volatile than the dividends (Shiller (1981)). Moreover,
short-term momentum and long-term reversal of stock market prices are empiri-
cally robust stock price anomalies (see, for example, Jegadeesh (1990), De Bondt
and Thaler (1985), Lo and MacKinlay (1999), Campbell (2000) and Hirshleifer
(2001)).
Various explanations of these phenomena are currently discussed. Conrad and
Kaul (1998) and Johnson (2002), for example, try to embed these phenomena into
the traditional view of finance. Models of behavioral finance, by contrast, explain
excess volatility and predictability of stock market prices by breaking with the
complete rationality hypothesis underlying traditional finance. See Jegadeesh
(2001), for example, for an evaluation of alternative explanations of stock price
momentum. The most prominent explanations (e.g. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sub-
rahmanyam (1998), Hong and Stein (1999), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998))
are based on “investor sentiment”. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), for
example, use a Lucas (1978) asset pricing model with a fundamental value fol-
lowing a random walk. The representative investor, however, believes that the
market switches between two regimes, a “momentum” and a “mean-reversion”
state, in accordance with some exogenous Markov process. If investors carry out
a Bayesian updating in every period, their behavior will exhibit two behavioral
anomalies, namely “representativeness bias” and “underreaction”.
In explaining these deviations from the fundamental values, we follow Keynes’
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(1936) classical description of stock markets. Starting from the observation that
very few investors hold stocks for ever, Keynes points out that for most investors
the selling value of their stock will be more important than the dividends. Hence
beliefs about the fundamental value of a stock may be less important than higher
order beliefs, i.e. beliefs about the other investors’ beliefs about the asset price. As
an analogy he also compares stock markets to newspaper beauty contests in which
the reader whose choice coincides with the average pick receives a prize. Thus,
in the short run, guessing the average opinion on the stock market price is much
more important than guessing the correct fundamental value. As a result, stock
market prices may deviate from their fundamental values. According to Keynes
they may even become an almost arbitrary social convention. While Keynes’
analogy of the beauty contest does not contain a prediction about the degree of
the deviation from the fundamental value, it has nevertheless made clear that in
the short run stock markets exhibit the structure of coordination games, as the
initial quote from a trader cited above also documents. The coordination game
structure of stock markets has recently also been emphasized in the behavioral
finance literature. Shleifer (2000), for example, points out the importance of
“noise trader risk”, which is also called “market risk”: All investment strategies
based on fundamental values run the risk that the average investor does not follow
the fundamental view. Even though the fundamental investor will eventually
benefit from his strategy, in the short run he will lose and may even be deprived
of his wealth before the long-term development of the asset prices turns to his
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favor. Or as Keynes has put it: “Markets can remain irrational longer than you
can remain solvent.” A prominent case for the importance of market risk are
the losses incurred by LTCM’s strategy based on the expectation that the share
prices of Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport and Trading should be in
line with a 3:2 parity. This fundamental view was based on the fact that these
two firms had agreed to share profits in this ratio. However, as Froot and Dabora
(1999) have documented from 1980 to 1995 the 3:2 parity was more and more
violated.
The idea of our paper is to argue that excess volatility, short-term momentum
and long-term reversal can be explained as the outcome of a repeated beauty
contest with noise. We have in mind a set of investors interacting repeatedly on
a market for a long-lived asset on which noise traders will also participate. To
separate the importance of second-order beliefs from the importance of having
correct beliefs about the underlying exogenous random process in the market, we
assume that it is common knowledge that noise trading follows a simple random
walk. Hence, in contrast to Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), the traders
have no misperceptions about the statistical distribution of the exogenous random
process. Moreover, as already argued by Keynes, we assume that in each period
the investors are assessed in terms of the gains/losses resulting from actions they
have taken in that period. To keep things simple, in each period every investor
can only decide to buy or to sell one unit of the asset. Consequently, if she decides
to buy (sell) and prices go up (down) in this period, the investor will get a fixed
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positive reward. Otherwise she will get a lower reward. In the first case this is
justified because the investor has bought an asset that appreciated in that period.
In the second case she has sold an asset that depreciated. One may think, for
example, of the investor as being the manager of a pension fund, an insurance
fund or a hedge fund. It is now a common business practice that the principals
of the funds evaluate the managers according to the per period performance of
the managers’ actions taken in that period. Moreover, one may also think of
private investors managing the family’s fortune. Again, the investor will then
be monitored by some of the other family members, most likely also in every
period. Stock market prices are determined endogenously by the demand and
supply in the asset market. In analogy to many market-maker models we assume
that prices go up if demand exceeds supply and vice versa. As in many asset
pricing models, the price movements in our model reflect the average opinion of
the market disturbed by some noise. Every player observes the price movement,
yet without knowing the individual players’ actions. That is to say the game we
are considering is a repeated coordination game with imperfect monitoring. The
first paper to study imperfect monitoring games was Green and Porter (1984) in
the context of an oligopoly model with stochastic demand. Their paper initiated
a whole line of research analyzing the set of equilibria and the learning dynamics
for this interesting class of games. See, for example, Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
(1990), Lehrer (1990), Lehrer (1992a), Lehrer (1992b), Kalai and Lehrer (1995)
and Gilli (1999).
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The specific model we are considering has numerous Nash equilibria. For
example, any pattern of coordinated play in which all strategic players choose
identical actions in every period, constitutes a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the repeated game. Hence, as in Keynes’ original beauty contest, the rational
outcome of the game is arbitrary. However, actual play of this game in the
computer laboratory gives a clear prediction: After an initial learning phase, all
strategic players decide to buy, i.e. they play “up” until the noise traders break
this “up” regime. Thereupon the strategic players switch to a coordinated play of
“down”, i.e. they decide to sell until the “down” regime is eventually broken by
noise so that the strategic players will switch back to playing “up”. We call this
outcome “switching behavior”. Note that this switching behavior produces price
trajectories that give rise to familiar stock price anomalies: Prices show excess
volatility in the sense that the variance of stock market prices is much higher
than the variance of the exogenous noise. Moreover, the prices show short-term
momentum because whenever the strategic players are coordinated in one of the
regimes the likelihood of price movements in the same direction is higher than
a reversal. Eventually price movements will revert because any “up” or “down”
regime will almost surely be broken by noise.
A natural interpretation of the outcome of this game is that the strategic
players change their sentiment from bullish, (“up”) to bearish (“down”) regimes.
Note that in our model both investor sentiment and its switches are endogenous
as well as rational. Investor sentiment is rational within and therefore also across
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periods because in every period it is the best response to the investor sentiment
shown by other investors. In particular, switching is also the best response to
switching. It is endogenous because the rational players could, for example, also
play stolid and remain in a particular mood.
In our model, given the per period evaluation of the performance of the in-
vestors, investor sentiment is the result of an equilibrium selection from the ra-
tional outcomes of a repeated coordination game with imperfect monitoring and
noise. As we will discuss in detail, the equilibrium selection can be explained by
well-known behavioral principles. The observed switching behavior is the only
rational equilibrium that is consistent with probability matching and focal point
analysis. It is consistent with probability matching because the relative frequency
of the actions chosen by the strategic players matches the relative frequency of
the outcome if it were determined by the dice only. Moreover, given a number of
equilibria focal points play a major role. In this game the strategic players could
use the outcome of the last period, the last two periods, the last three periods,
etc. as a coordination device. The simplest such coordination device is to choose
the outcome of the last period, and this is also what we observe.
To conclude the introduction, recall that Keynes (1936, p. 154) has already
put forward the following observation: If stock market prices are not based on
fundamentals but on second-order beliefs, then they can change “. . . violently as
the result of a sudden fluctuation in opinion due to factors which do not really
make much difference to the prospective yield. . . .” This is exactly what we ob-
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serve as the result of our asset market game. In our market, prices are determined
only by second-order beliefs and the current period outcome of the dice does not
make a difference to the prospective future yield of the asset. Consequently, as
Keynes summarizes on the same page of his book “. . . the market will be subject
to waves of optimistic and pessimistic sentiment. . . .”
In the next section we give a formal representation of the game considered in
this paper. Thereafter, in section 3, we describe the experimental set-up. Section
4 presents our results and section 5 concludes with a discussion.
2 The Model
We model the stock market by a stochastic coordination game. The game is
played repeatedly in a finite number of periods. First we explain the stage game
and then we define the repeated game as a sequence of such stage games.
2.1 The stage game
There is an odd number of strategic agents i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, who in every
period can buy or sell one unit of an asset. Since buying (selling) is rational only
if the agent predicts that the asset price goes up (down) we sometime identify
their actions with their predictions. Hence, the strategy set of agent i is given by
Si = S = {u, d}, where u(p) means that the agent buys because he predicts an
increasing and d(own) means that she sells because she predicts a decreasing stock
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price. Her payoff is a fixed amount G(ain) if she predicted the correct movement
and it is L(oss) otherwise. One may think of the investors as being agents for
some principals of a fund. In every period the principals reward the agents by
the success of their action taken at the beginning of that period. Hence, if the
agent predicted that the asset price goes up and has thus bought an extra unit of
the asset then this action was optimal if and only if prices increase. Analogously,
selling one unit of the asset is the best action of that period if prices decrease.
We assume that G > 0 ≥ L. The actual stock price movement is determined by
the actions of all agents and of n+ 1 noise traders who are modelled as follows.
Noise traders can be in an “up” or “down” mood. There is a correlated shock
to the population of noise traders which determines the number of noise traders
in “up” and “down” mood. Let ω ∈ Ω = {0, 1, . . . , n + 1} denote the number
of noise traders who are in an “up” mood and let P (ω) be the probability that
ω ∈ Ω is realized. We assume that P (ω) = 1/(n+ 2) for all ω ∈ Ω.
The noise traders’ sentiment is given by the difference in the number of traders
in “up”, respectively “down” mood, i.e. by the random variable
X : Ω → Z
ω 7→ X(ω) = 2ω − n− 1.
Hence, the probability that the noise traders’ sentiment is positive or negative,
respectively, is 0.5(n+1)/(n+2) and the probability that it is constant is 1/(n+2).
The actions of strategic agents and the noise traders’ sentiment are combined
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in a linear way to determine change in the stock price. Let s ∈ ×ni=1Si be
the strategy profile of the agents and let ω ∈ Ω. Then the stock price change
r = r(s, ω) is given by
r(s, ω) =

u , if |{i | si = u}| − |{i | si = d}|+X(ω) > 0
d , else
.1
Thus, the stock price will increase if total investors’ sentiment about the price
change is positive, otherwise it will decrease. As we have argued in the introduc-
tion this feature, that stock price changes are the result coordination among the
traders, seems to be conform with what we observe on real markets, at least in
the short run: if the majority of traders believes that stock prices will go up (and
hence act accordingly), prices will indeed go up.
Given s ∈ ×ni=1Si and ω ∈ Ω the payoff of player i is
pii(s, ω) =

G , if si = r(s, ω)
L , else
.
The players have their actions simultaneously knowing neither the actions
chosen by the other players nor the result of the chance move that determines
the noise traders’ sentiment. All strategic players have complete information
about the structure of the game. We denote by Γ = (I, (Si)i, (pi
i)i) the game thus
defined.
1By |A| we denote the cardinality of a set A.
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The stage game Γ is a symmetric coordination game in expected payoffs.
Hence, it is immediate to see that it has two Nash equlibria in pure strategies,
namely sU with sUi = u for all i = 1, . . . , n, and s
D with sDi = d for all i = 1, . . . , n.
The expected payoff of agent i at these equilibria is
Epii(sU , ω) = Epii(sD, ω) =
n+ 1
n+ 2
G+
1
n+ 2
L.
A mixed strategy αi of player i is a probability distribution over Si, i.e. αi ∈
∆(Si).
2 The following theorem shows that the stage game has a unique equilib-
rium α = (α1, . . . , αn) in strictly mixed strategies where αi(u) = αi(d) = 0.5 for
all i. The proof is in Appendix A.
Theorem 2.1 Let α = (α1, . . . , αn) be a mixed strategy profile with αi(u) ∈ (0, 1)
for at least one i. Then α is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of Γ if and only
if αi(u) = αi(d) = 0.5 for all i.
Observe that the expected payoff of an agent in the mixed Nash equilibrium is
lower than her expected payoff in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
2.2 The repeated game
Consider now the game that results from a finite repetition of the game Γ. There
is a finite number of periods t = 1, 2, . . . , T , and in each period t the stage game Γ
is being played. Contrary to the stage game we now have to distinguish between
2By ∆(S) we denote the set of all probability distributions over the finite set S.
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an action taken by player i in period t and her strategy in t. Let
Ait = A
i = {u, d}
be the set of possible actions of player i in period t and denote by ait ∈ Ait the
action chosen by i in period t. By ωt we denote the realization of ω ∈ Ω in period
t. At the end of period t, each agent is informed about the price change rt in
that period but neither about ωt nor about the actions taken by the other agents.
Hence,
hit = ((a
i
1, r1), . . . , (a
i
t, rt))
is the history known by agent i at the beginning of period t+ 1 if she has taken
actions aiτ and the price change was rτ in periods τ = 1, . . . , t. By H
i
t we denote
the set of all histories of agent i up to period t and we let
H i =
T−1⋃
t=0
H it for i = 1, . . . , n,
where H i0 = {h0} and h0 is the null history. A behavior strategy of agent i is a
mapping si : H
i → ∆(Ai) such that si(hit) ∈ ∆(Ai) is the probability distribution
over i’s actions in period t+1 if the history is hit.
3 By Si we denote the set of all
behavior strategies of player i. The total expected payoff of player i at a strategy
profile s ∈ ×ni=1Si is given by
ui(s) = E
T−1∑
t=0
pii
[(
s1(h
1
t ), . . . , sn(h
n
t )
)
, ωt
]
,
3Observe that by Kuhn’s (1953) theorem we can restrict to behavior strategies since the
repeated game we study is a game with perfect recall.
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where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability distribution in-
duced on individual histories and on paths (ωt)t by the strategies of the players
and the noise. By ΓT = (I, (Si)i, (u
i)i) we denote the T times repeated coordi-
nation game with imperfect monitoring thus defined.
In the following we will study the Nash equilibria of ΓT . It is immediate to see
that s is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it leads to coordination
in all periods. Hence, any sequence of pure Nash equilibria of the stage game
is a pure Nash equilibrium of ΓT . Among these there are two stationary pure
Nash equilibria sU and sD with sUi (h
i
t)(u) = 1, respectively s
D
i (h
i
t)(u) = 0 for
all hit ∈ H i and all i. We call this stolid (up or down) behavior. Under stolid
behavior the price process is i.i.d. with
Prob(rt = u) =
n+ 1
n+ 2
, Prob(rt = d) =
1
n+ 2
for stolid up and with
Prob(rt = d) =
n+ 1
n+ 2
, Prob(rt = u) =
1
n+ 2
for all t = 1, . . . , T , for stolid down.
But these are not the only possible equilibria in pure strategies. Obviously
any pure strategy Nash equilibrium is payoff equivalent to a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies that depend on public information only, i.e. only on past price
changes rτ and not on past actions a
i
τ . One particularly simple Nash equilibrium
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in nontrivial public strategies is sSW with
sSWi (h
i
t)(u) =

1 , if rt = u
0 , else
,
for all hit ∈ H it , all i and all t ≥ 1, and sSWi (h0)(u) = sSWj (h0)(u) ∈ {0, 1} for
all i 6= j. Here, the price change of the last period is taken as a signal on which
traders coordinate their action: players choose the last price movement as their
action in any period t ≥ 2. We call this switch behavior since the strategic traders’
sentiment changes from an extreme “up” to an extreme “down” mood if and only
if the noise traders have overruled them in the last period. Under switch behavior
the price process is a stationary Markov process with
Prob(rt+1 = u | rt = u) = n+ 1
n+ 2
Prob(rt+1 = u | rt = d) = 1
n+ 2
for all t = 1, . . . , T .
The repeated game also has many (perfect Bayesian) Nash equilibria in mixed
strategies. For example, any sequence of pure and mixed Nash equilibria of
the stage game gives rise to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the repeated
game. In particular, there is the stationary and symmetric mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium sR with sR(hit)(u) = 0.5 for all h
i
t ∈ H i and all i. We call this random
behavior. In this case the price process is a random walk with
Prob(rt = u) = 0.5
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for all t = 1, . . . , T . Moreover, it is easy to see that any Nash equilibrium in
strategies that depend on public information only must be given by a sequence of
Nash equilibria (pure or mixed) of the stage game. In addition there is a plethora
of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria that depend on private information.
Summarizing we see that the repeated game has a large number of Nash
equilibria and that the stochastic properties of the price process depend on the
equilibrium that is being played. The only equilibrium selection theory that
gives a unique prediction and is not based on behavioral principles is due to
Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Their procedure selects the equilibrium with random
behavior (in each period all players mix between u(p) and d(own) with probability
0.5). This is due to symmetry reasons and the fact that the Harsanyi-Selten
procedure always selects a unique equilibrium. Since our game is symmetric
with respect to the actions u(p) and d(own) and since the selection must not
depend on the labelling of these actions, there is only one equilibrium for which
there does not exist a different equilibrium with the role of the actions u(p)
and d(own) just exchanged: the equilibrium with random behavior. This gives
a testable hypothesis since we have seen that with random behavior the price
process is a random walk, i.e. the exogenous randomness caused by noise traders
is transformed one-to-one into endogenous randomness of the price process and
phenomena like momentum, mean reversion of excess volatility should not be
observed.
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In the next section we will present the results of an experiment where the
game was played in a computer laboratory. Surprisingly, the robust finding is
that from the large set of equilibria the participants in this experiment select the
switch equilibrium.
3 The Experiment
3.1 Hypotheses
From the equilibrium analysis we deduce the following testable hypotheses. The
first question is whether we observe a random walk of the price or a different price
distribution caused by a changing investors’ sentiment connected with excess
volatility. Hypothesis 1 consists of two parts and tests for a random walk and
excess volatility.
Hypothesis 1a: The price movement is not a random walk.
Hypothesis 1b: The price volatility is higher than the volatility of the noise
traders’ sentiment (the chance move). We take the noise traders’ sentiment
as reference volatility to determine excess volatility, because in our model the
price movement would follow the noise traders’ sentiment if no other agents were
present.
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The next question concerns individual behavior in more detail. First we test for
coordination.
Hypothesis 2: The agents are coordinated and use the same action in all peri-
ods.
As discussed above the game has several pure-strategy equilibria. One main point
of discussion is which equilibrium is selected. We consider three main candidates
(which are intuitive) as possible equilibrium outcomes: all agents play stolid u(p)
every period, all agents play stolid d(own) every period, or all agents play the
switch equilibrium. The third hypothesis correspondingly has three parts.
Hypothesis 3a: All agents play u(p) every period.
Hypothesis 3b: All agents play d(own) every period.
Hypothesis 3c: All agents play a switch strategy corresponding to the switch
equilibrium.
In the last hypothesis we connect the behavior in the beginning of the game to
the finally selected strategies. We focus on the expected three main types which
are: play u(p) every period, play d(own) every period or switch (which need not
be coordinated in the beginning as it is in the equilibrium strategy). We want to
test whether the initial behavior correlates with the final behavior.
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Hypothesis 4: If the majority of agents in a group plays either only u(p), only
d(own) or switch (uncoordinated) in the beginning, then the resulting equilibrium
will be that either all agents play u(p) or d(own) or switch, respectively.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 The Participants
50 students from the University of Zurich participated in the experiment. They
were recruited by announcements in the university promising a monetary re-
ward contingent on performance in a group decision making experiment. The
participants’ payoffs were given in ECU (experimental currency units). 100 ECU
corresponded to 1 CHF (approximately $0.6). The average payoff of a participant
was 40 CHF (approximately $25).
3.2.2 Experimental Procedure
The experiment lasted approximately 90 minutes with the first 20 minutes con-
sisting of orientation and instructions and they were conducted in the computer
laboratories of the University of Zurich. After the instructions on the structure
of the game the participants played single games with 5 participants per game
(n = 5). The noise traders’ sentiment was determined by a 10-sided dice. The
numbers 0 to 6 were identified with ω. For higher numbers the throw was re-
peated. We chose L = 0 to avoid the influence of loss aversion in our results. The
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gain was G = 20 ECU. The game was played in 5 sessions with 2 groups each
(i.e. 10 participants per session). Participants were assigned randomly to a group.
Each group played twice a sequence of 100 periods via computer terminals. The
computer terminals were well separated from one another preventing communi-
cation between the participants. The price change and the gain of a person in
a period were displayed on a computer terminal in the following period. The
changes of the last seven periods were also visible. The subjects could see the
total history by scrolling down in the field in which the last seven periods were
displayed. Because their decision might depend on the whole history we made
this information available.
After the single plays of the game a strategy game was played . All partic-
ipants selected their strategies for this game. The strategies could depend on
the whole information they had, especially on the whole history of play of the
game and on their gains and on the period (a detailed description of the strategy
game is given in Appendix B). The participants were asked to indicate when they
change their strategy from u(p) to d(own) and when they change from d(own)
to u(p) . They were free to give a response as they wanted, e.g. they could also
choose a free text as an answer. One play of the strategy game was paid per
person.4 For this play the participants were randomly matched to each other.
They were informed about this procedure.
4The payoff in the strategy game was 20 times as much as that in the single plays.
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After the experiment was completed the participants were paid separately in
cash contingent on their performance.
4 Results
Figures 1a, 1b, 1c show a typical outcome of the second 100 period round of the
experiment. The full data set can be found in Appendix C. Figure 1a displays
the cumulated change in the noise traders’ sentiment and in the price, Figure
1b shows the choices of all participants and the price movement and Figure 1c
presents the observed frequency of U(p) among the participants and the noise
traders.
From Figures 1b and 1c we see that except for one period the participants
are always coordinated. The price movement shows several periods of increasing
prices followed by several periods of decreasing prices which are again followed
by increasing prices and so on. If we compare Figure 1a with Figure 1c we
find that the price movement changes direction exactly in those periods where
the noise traders overrule the coordinated participants. Except for one period
all participants are throughout coordinated on the price change of the previous
period. Apparently the price movement is not a random walk, but shows the
investors’ sentiment phenomenon.
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Figures 1a, 1b, 1c: Prices, noise traders’ sentiment and coordination. 
 
Figure 1a: Cumulated change in the noise traders’ sentiment (diamonds) and in the 
price (triangles). 
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Figure 1b: Price change (triangles) and choices of the participants (circles and other 
shapes). Only the line with circles is visible, since all 5 lines overlap, except in period 
12 where one person deviates. “Up” is denoted as +1 and “down” as -1. 
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Figure 1c: Frequency of “up” choice among participants (rectangles) and noise 
traders (diamonds). 
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Tables 1a and 1b: The result of the strategy game. 
 
 
 
Table 1a: 
Choices in period 1 
u(p)1 d(own) 
50 0 
 
Table 1b: 
Types of strategies 
Switch2 after 
being wrong 
once 
Switch after 
being wrong 
twice 
Switch after 
being wrong 
three times 
Switch after 
being wrong 
twice and 
being right 
seven/eight 
times3 
Switch after 
being wrong 
twice and 
being right 
three times 
41 3 14 3 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 All participants played u(p) until their strategies to switch given in Table 1b could be applied for the first time. 
2 Switching does for no participant depend on whether to switch from u(p) to d(own) or from d(own) to u(p). 
3 The numbers seven or eight differed between the 3 persons who chose this rule. 
4 This person added a complicate estimation about the future development of the price to this rule. 
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For a more detailed analysis we include the strategies obtained in the strategy
game from experienced participants. Tables 1a and 1b show the frequencies of
the different strategies. In the first period all participants choose u(p). In later
periods they indicate under which conditions they switch their action from u(p)
to d(own) and vice versa. For no person the decision to switch does depend on the
direction (u(p) to d(own) or d(own) to u(p)). We observe five types of strategies
which can be reduced to two main types. The first three types are of the form
“switch after one’s choice was wrong”, i.e. after receiving the payoff zero. The
switching only depends on the number of times someone has been wrong. 41
persons switch after they have been wrong once. This behavior corresponds to
the switch equilibrium. Three participants switch after being wrong twice and
one participant switches after being wrong three times. These strategies are of
the same principal type as the first one. Although the participants were free to
choose their strategy (they could even write a free text), most of them chose the
same strategy or one similar to this. Three persons switch also after being right
seven or eight times and two persons switch also after being right three times.
These strategies reveal a preference for switching in contrast to the coordination
observed in the 45 strategies of the first three types. One interpretation of these
strategies might be that these persons want to match the movement of the noise
traders’ sentiment.
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We use the data of the single plays of the game to test our hypotheses. The
first hypothesis is that we do not observe a random walk in the price movement
but a changing investors’ sentiment. The null hypothesis that we observe a
random walk can be rejected on a 5%-level for all groups (and on a 1%-level for
nine groups). In nine groups we observe sequences of only u(p) and only d(own)
with a length of at least seven. Assuming any Markovian distribution which
generates these transitions these sequences have a probability of less than 1%. In
all groups the cumulative price differs from the cumulated noise traders’ sentiment
in at least 90% of the periods. We also do not observe agents always playing u(p)
or always playing d(own), but switching behavior in at least nine groups which
we will characterize further by an analysis of the individual data. The one group
that did not clearly show the behavior corresponding to the switch equilibrium
consisted mainly of players who selected strategies in the strategy game which
were of the last two types (cf. Table 1b).
The volatility of the price movement is in nine groups higher than the volatility
of the movement of the noise traders’ sentiment. The null hypothesis that we do
not observe excess volatility is therefore rejected on the 1%-level in a binomial-
test. This result supports our Hypothesis 1b that we observe excess volatility.
The next question we analyze concerns the coordination of the players. For
a test of the hypothesis whether they are coordinated or not we compare the
number of periods in which all agents use the same action with the number of
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periods in which they do not. First we classify one group as coordinated or
not and than we use these data for a test. If one tests the null hypothesis that
agents randomly choose their actions (assuming independence of the periods) in
a two-sided binomial test the actual frequency of correlation is much too high.
For every group the null hypothesis is rejected on a 5%-level (for nine groups it
is rejected on the 1%-level). Since we can only treat every single group as an
independent observation we classify a group as coordinated or not by the above
test. We therefore have ten coordinated groups which allows us to reject the null
hypothesis that the agents are not coordinated on the 1%-level on basis of the
independent observations.
The third hypothesis is about the selection between possible equilibria. In no
group stolid u(p) is observed. The same is true for the strategy stolid d(own). We
thus have ten observations contradicting such a prediction. The corresponding
Hypotheses 3a and 3b are rejected in a one-sided binomial test on the 1%-level.
Next we test Hypotheses 3c, i.e. whether the observed switching behavior is
coordinated in the switch equilibrium. To this end we analyze whether the price
switches at the points at which the chance move (the noise traders’ sentiment)
determines the price by overruling the strategic traders as it should in the switch
equilibrium. We therefore count for every group separately the cases in which
only the chance move determined the price (ω = 0 or ω = 6) and the participants
followed this price change in the period afterwards and compare these cases with
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the ones in which the chance move determined the price and the participants did
not follow it. We thus test the switch equilibrium against the random walk and
the stolid up, respectively, stolid down equilibrium. We say that a groups plays
the switch equilibrium, if the null hypothesis that a price change occurs after the
chance move determined the price has probability 0.5 (random move) and the
null hypothesis that it has probability 6/7 (u(p), respectively, d(own) play) are
both rejected. We can reject these hypotheses on the 5%-level for nine groups.
Again we have nine groups showing the switch equilibrium which is significant on
the 1%-level in a one-sided binomial test. Hence, if we analyze the critical points
of the price movement, which are those periods where only the noise traders’
sentiment determined the price, the behavior in the following periods supports
the switch equilibrium.
A second supporting argument for the observation of the switch equilibrium
is obtained from the strategies given in the strategy game: 80% of the subjects
play the switch strategy (if we allow for slight modifications around 90% play
it). It is not possible to test the result against all other strategies. We test it
against the other observed strategies in a chi-square-test. The null hypothesis
that any observed strategy is equally likely as the switch strategy is rejected on
the 1%-level assuming independence of all strategies.
The last hypothesis concerns the behavior at the beginning and at the end of
the game. We do not only consider the first period of the game, where all subjects
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are coordinated on u(p) (see Table 1a) but the first ten periods. We take ten
because we want to observe whether subjects play always u(p) or tend to switch
(for whatever reasons). Ten is chosen arbitrarily, but for smaller numbers it is too
likely that a switching on the signal of the noise traders’ sentiment determining
the price will not be observed. The hypothesis that subjects do not switch at
least once in the first ten periods is rejected in a one-sided binomial test on the
1%-level assuming that all choices are independent.
Now we use the following criterion: A group shows switching behavior if we
observe switching behavior for the majority of group members. Assuming that
only the 10 groups are independent this gives the same test result as above.
According to the strategies in the strategy game which are already coordi-
nated more than 80% of the subjects switch after ω = 0 occurs for the the first
time. Switching depends on the probability that ω = 0 occurs. Nevertheless all
participants will switch with probability one in a game of infinite length.
Thus we observe switching behavior in the beginning which is coordinated in
a switch equilibrium at the end of the game.
5 Discussion
The experimental results clearly show that the switch equilibrium is selected in
our stock market game. This is different from the prediction of the Harsanyi and
Selten (1988) theory according to which the random behavior equilibrium should
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be selected. Hence, we will look for a refinement criterion relying on behavioral
principles that solves the selection problem.
There are two main arguments for the selection of the switch equilibrium that
we would like to put forward here, prominence (or focal points) and probability
matching. If there are multiple equilibria and agents do not have any information
about the strategy choices of the other players they do not know on which equilib-
rium they should coordinate. This situation was already illustrated by Schelling
(1960) with his well known example about two strangers having to decide about a
meeting point in New York without being able to communicate with each other.
Schelling introduced the idea that persons coordinate on “focal points” (like the
Grand Central Station in New York) if they have to solve such a problem. Focal
or prominent points are the ones that easily come into the mind of a person if
she thinks about the problem. However, choosing a focal point equilibrium in a
symmetric coordination game requires the actions to be labelled in the same way
for all players, i.e. it requires the existence of a common “frame”. Otherwise, the
players are in a state of complete ignorance about how their opponents perceive
the game so that mixing uniformly between all actions seems to be the only rea-
sonable thing to do. Hence, if there were no common frame in our game we would
expect to observe the mixed equilibrium we named “random behavior”. As we
have seen, this is also the equilibrium that is selected according to the theory of
Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
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In our case actions are labelled “up” and “down” so that there is a common
frame and the notion of a focal point can, in principle, be applied. Both actions,
u(p) and d(own), could be focal leading to the stolid u(p), respectively stolid
d(own) equilibria. One may suspect that the action u(p) is the focal one, which
is also confirmed by the participants’ choice in the first period of the strategy
game. Nevertheless, in our experiments we neither observe the stolid u(p) nor the
stolid d(own) equilibrium. This indicates that the players are uncertain about
their opponents’ attitude towards u(p) and d(own). In other words, there is a
common frame but there is uncertainty about the interpretation of this frame.
This uncertainty can be resolved by using a public signal in order to label an
action as “focal”. In the repeated coordination game we are studying the price
movement is an endogenous and publicly observable signal. Any history of past
prices can be used as a signal but we will argue that the last period’s price is
the prominent one. Firstly, using the price movement in more than one period
requires a sophisticated rule about how to translate these signals into actions.
Hence, one coordination problem is replaced by another making the use of more
than one signal very unreasonable.5 A different argument in favor of using only
one signal, i.e. one past price, relies on costs (cf. Binmore and Samuelson (2002)).
If the observation and processing of a signal is costly, because it causes disutility,
5Of course, there is also not a unique way to translate the price in one period into an action
but choosing u(p) and not d(own) when the signal was “up” clearly is the focal point here.
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then the players’ payoffs are maximized if they use one signal only.6 Assuming
that the cost of observing and processing a signal is not too high the players’
payoff with the signal is higher than without, since in the latter case they are
unable to identify focal points and will end up playing the mixed equilibrium with
random behavior as we have argued above. Secondly, using the last period’s price
as a signal seems to be more prominent than using the price in any other previous
period. The time scale induces a common framing which makes the last period’s
price a focal signal. Summarizing, in the switch equilibrium players overcome the
coordination problem by choosing in each period the action that is focal according
to the publicly observed signal, namely last period’s price movement.
The second argument supporting the switch equilibrium considers the finding
of Hypothesis 4. Even in the beginning of play participants switch (not coor-
dinated, but they switch). In order to explain this preference for switching we
consider this game for n = 1, i.e. a single person decision making problem for
which the coordination problem disappears. It is known from many psychologi-
cal studies (for a review see Fiorina (1971) or Brackbill and Bravos (1962)) that
animals and human beings tend to perform probability matching in similar situ-
ations. This kind of behavior was also regarded as important for decision making
by Arrow (1958). In our game probability matching means that persons select
their strategy such that the frequency of u(p) choices is equal to the probabil-
6Provided, of course, they use the signal in the most efficient way, so that they achieve
perfect coordination of their actions.
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ity that the noise traders’ sentiment is positive. Since there is no coordination
problem the payoff of this strategy is equal to the payoff for playing u(p) ev-
ery period or mixing with any probability. The secondary criterion here is that
persons “like” to perform probability matching. In our experiment we observe
switching behavior in the beginning analogous to probability matching. One sim-
ple argument for the switch equilibrium to be selected then is that it is the only
prominent equilibrium (like always playing u(p) or always playing d(own)) in
which switching behavior is coordinated.
Contrary to stolid up, stolid down or random behavior play of the switch
equilibrium induces price trajectories that share many properties with real stock
market prices. The price process shows short-term momentum, i.e. the proba-
bility of a price increase (decrease) is higher than that of a decrease (increase)
whenever the price increased (decreased) in the last period. It shows long-term
reversal since eventually any “up” or “down” regime is broken by noise and it
shows excess volatility, i.e. the variance of prices is higher than the variance of the
exogenous noise. Interestingly, in order to generate these properties our model
does not appeal to notions of boundedly rational behavior.7 Instead, the ob-
served price process is driven by equilibrium play where the players’ sentiment
constantly changes between an “up” and a “down” mood and the turning points
are determined by exogenous noise. Hence, seemingly irrational stock market
phenomena can in fact be explained by rational investor sentiment.
7This is true even if the observed equilibrium selection may be the result of boundedly
rational behavior.
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A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.1: Let α = (α1, . . . , αn) be a mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium of Γ. With a slight abuse of notation we let αi = αi(u) for all i ∈ I. Then
αi = 1 implies
Prob(r = u |α−i, si = u) ≥ Prob(r = d |α−i, si = d)
⇐⇒
n−1∑
l=0
l + 2
n+ 2
∑
K⊂I\{i}
|K|=l
∏
k∈K
αk
∏
k/∈K
k 6=i
(1− αk) >
n−1∑
l=0
l + 2
n+ 2
∑
K⊂I\{i}
|K|=l
∏
k∈K
(1− αk)
∏
k/∈K
k 6=i
αk
⇐⇒
n−1∑
l=0
2l − n+ 1
n+ 2
∑
K⊂I\{i}
|K|=l
∏
k∈K
αk
∏
k/∈K
k 6=i
(1− αk) ≥ 0.
(1)
Similarly, αi = 0 implies that the inequality holds with “≤”, and αi ∈ (0, 1)
implies that the inequality is an equality “=”.
Let i be such that αi ∈ (0, 1) and assume by way of contradiction that there
exists j 6= i such that αj 6= αi. If αj ∈ (0, 1), then from (1) it follows that
(αj − αi) 2
n+ 2
n−2∑
l=0
∑
K⊂I\{i,j}
|K|=l
∏
k∈K
αk
∏
k/∈K
k/∈{i,j}
(1− αk) = 0
which is impossible if αi 6= αj. Similarly, one can show that αj = 1 and αj = 0
lead to a contradiction. Hence, α1 = α2 = . . . = αn =: α¯ ∈ (0, 1).
Assume by way of contradiction that α¯ 6= 0.5. W.l.o.g. let α¯ > 0.5. Then,
from (1) it follows that
0 =
n−1∑
l=0
2l − n+ 1
n+ 2
∑
K⊂I\{i}
|K|=l
α¯l(1− α¯)n−1−l
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>n−1∑
l=0
2l − n+ 1
n+ 2
(
n− 1
l
)
(1− α¯)n−1 = 0.
This contradiction proves the theorem.
¤
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Appendix B: Instructions 
 
In the following we present the instructions for the single as well as for the strategy 
game as they were given to the participants of the experiment. 
 
 
 
A Game about the Movement of Security Prices 
 
Welcome! You are participating in a game about the development of security prices. 
Your payoff depends on your success in the game. 
 
 
Instructions 
 
Participants 
Altogether there are 5 players in your group. 
 
Overview of the game 
The game is played for 100 periods. In each period you have to predict whether the 
price of a security goes up or down. You get a positive payoff if your prediction is 
correct, otherwise you do not get a payoff. 
 
Your Endowment and Actions 
In each period you get 1 point which you can place on any of the following 
alternatives: 
 
A: the security price goes up 
B: the security price goes down 
 
 36
  
Your Payoff 
At the end of each period you receive a payoff of 20 ECU (Experimental Currency 
Units) if you correctly predicted the movement of the security price in that period. 
That is you get 20 ECU if either you put 1 point on A (the security price does up) and 
the security price went up or you put 1 point on B (the security price goes down) and 
the security price went down. Otherwise you get 0 ECU. 
 
 
The Determination of the Security Price Movement 
 
Whether the security price goes up or down in a period is a result of the decision of all 
players and the throw of a fair dice which has seven sides with 0,1,...,5,6, points. All 
sides are equally likely. 
 
After all players have put their point on either A (the security price goes up) or B (the 
security price goes down) the dice is thrown.  Afterwards the total number of points 
on A and on B is determined. The points on the dice are added to the sum of the 
points which the players placed on A.  6 - the points on the dice is added to the sum of 
the points which the players placed on B. 
 
The security price goes up if the total number of points on A (the security price goes 
up) is larger than the total number of points on B (the security price goes down). 
Otherwise the security price goes down. Since the maximal sum of points for an 
alternative is 11, the security price goes up if the points for alternative A (the price 
goes up) are at least 6. The price goes down if the points for alternative B (the price 
goes down) are at least 6. 
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 Your Information 
At the end of each period you are informed about the movement of the security price 
and your payoff in this period. You do not get any information about the decisions of 
the other players or the result of the throw of the dice. In addition the prices of all 
previous periods are displayed. 
 
 
Tables  
The tables on the following page summarize the determination of the security price 
movement depending on the decisions of all players and the throw of the dice. 
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Table 1: Total Number of Points on A (the security price goes up) 
Number of persons who choose A (the security price goes up) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Number of persons who choose B (the security price goes down) 
 
 
 
Points on 
the dice 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
0 0 Points 1 Point 2 Points 3 Points 4 Points 5 Points 
1 1 Point 2 Points 3 Points 4 Points 5 Points 6 Points 
2 2 Points 3 Points 4 Points 5 Points 6 Points 7 Points 
3 3 Points 4 Points 5 Points 6 Points 7 Points 8 Points 
4 4 Points 5 Points 6 Points 7 Points 8 Points 9 Points 
5 5 Points 6 Points 7 Points 8 Points 9 Points 10 Points 
6 6 Points 7 Points 8 Points 9 Points 10 Points 11 Points 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Total Number of Points on B (the security price goes down) 
Number of persons who choose A (the security price goes up) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Number of persons who choose B (the security price goes down) 
 
 
 
Points on 
the dice 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
0 11 Points 10 Points 9 Points 8 Points 7 Points 6 Points 
1 10 Points 9 Points 8 Points 7 Points 6 Points 5 Points 
2 9 Points 8 Points 7 Points 6 Points 5 Points 4 Points 
3 8 Points 7 Points 6 Points 5 Points 4 Points 3 Points 
4 7 Points 6 Points 5 Points 4 Points 3 Points 2 Points 
5 6 Points 5 Points 4 Points 3 Points 2 Points 1 Point 
6 5 Points 4 Points 3 Points 2 Points 1 Point 0 Points 
≥6 Points: Security price goes up 
≥6 Points: Security price goes down 
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Stages of a period 
Every period (between 1 and 100) is identical: 
 
1. You make your decision: 1 point on 
Alternative A: the security price goes up 
or 
Alternative B: the security price goes down. 
 
2. A dice is thrown: 
The points on the dice are added to the sum of the points which the players placed 
on A.   
6 - the points on the dice is added to the sum of the points which the players 
placed on B. 
 
3. Determination whether the security price goes up or down according to Tables 1 
and 2. 
 
4. You receive your payoff of 20 ECU or 0 ECU. 
 
*  1 ECU corresponds to 1 Swiss centime. 
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 Strategy game 
 
 
In this game you indicate your choices in the games for all periods in advance. Decide 
what you choose in which situation. Your choice can for example depend on the 
current period, on 1, 2, 3, … or arbitrarily many pre periods. For each of these pre 
periods your decision might depend on the price in this period or whether your 
prediction was correct or not. To write down your strategy you can choose the 
following sheets. But you can also write down your strategy as you want. One game is 
played using your strategy and paid. 1 ECU corresponds to 20 Swiss centimes 
(previous payoff times 20). 
 
 
 
 
1. period:  
 
Please decide whether you put your point on A (the price goes up) or B (the price 
goes down). 
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Applicable to Period:  
 
a) Decide when you change from the price goes up (A) to the price goes down (B).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Decide when you change from the price goes down (B) to the price goes up (A): 
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Appendix C: Experimental Results 
 
The following figures show the experimental results for all groups and all rounds. See 
Figures 1a, 1b, 1c, for an explanation of the different charts. 
 
 
Group 1, Round 1: Cumulated Change in Noise Traders' Sentiment and Price
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Group 1, Round 1: Price Change and Choices of Participants
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Group 1, Round 2: Price Change and Choices of Participants
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Group 1, Round 1: Frequency of "Up" among Strategic Traders and Noise Traders
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Group 2, Round 1: Cumulated Change in Noise Traders' Sentiment and Price
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Group 2, Round 2: Cumulated Change in Noise Traders' Sentiment and Price
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Group 2, Round 1: Price Change and Choices of Participants
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Group 2, Round 1: Frequency of "Up" among Strategic Traders and Noise Traders
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 Group 3, Round 1: Cumulated Change in Noise Traders' Sentiment and Price
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Group 3, Round 2: Cumulated Change in Noise Traders' Sentiment and Price
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Group 3, Round 1: Price Change and Choices of Participants
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Group 3, Round 2: Price Change and Choices of Participants
-1
0
1
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Period
player 1
player 2
player 3
player 4
player 5
price
 
 
 
 50
Group 3, Round 1: Frequency of "Up" among Strategic Traders and Noise Traders
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Group 4, Round 1: Cumulated Change in Noise Traders' Sentiment and Price
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Group 4, Round 1: Price Change and Choices of Participants
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Group 4, Round 1: Frequency of "Up" among Strategic Traders and Noise Traders
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Group 4, Round 2: Frequency of "Up" among Strategic Traders and Noise Traders
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Group 5, Round 1: Cumulated Change in Noise Traders' Sentiment and Price
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Group 5, Round 1: Price Change and Choices of Participants
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Group 5, Round 1: Frequency of "Up" among Strategic Traders and Noise Traders
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Group 5, Round 2: Frequency of "Up" among Strategic Traders and Noise Traders
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Group 6, Round 1: Cumulated Change in Noise Traders' Sentiment and Price
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Group 6, Round 1: Price Change and Choices of Participants
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Group 6, Round 1: Frequency of "Up" among Strategic Traders and Noise Traders
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Group 7, Round 1: Cumulated Change in Noise Traders' Sentiment and Price
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Group 7, Round 1: Price Change and Choices of Participants
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Group 8, Round 1: Cumulated Change in Noise Traders' Sentiment and Price
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 Group 8, Round 1: Price Change and Choices of Participants
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Group 8, Round 1: Frequency of "Up" among Strategic Traders and Noise Traders
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Group 9, Round 1: Cumulated Change in Noise Traders' Sentiment and Price
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Group 9, Round 1: Price Change and Choices of Participants
-1
0
1
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Period
player 1
player 2
player 3
player 4
player 5
price
 
 
 
Group 9, Round 2: Price Change and Choices of Participants
-1
0
1
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Period
player 1
player 2
player 3
player 4
player 5
price
 
 
 
 
 68
Group 9, Round 1: Frequency of "Up" among Strategic Traders and Noise Traders
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Group 10, Round 1: Cumulated Change in Noise Traders' Sentiment and Price
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Group 10, Round 1: Price Change and Choices of Participants
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Group 10, Round 1: Frequency of "Up" among Strategic Traders and Noise Traders
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